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Abstract
We consider three popular affirmative action policies in school choice: quota-based,
priority-based, and reserve-based affirmative actions. The Boston mechanism (BM) is
responsive to the latter two policies in that a stronger priority-based or reserve-based
affirmative action makes some minority student better off. However, a stronger quota-
based affirmative action may yield a Pareto inferior outcome for the minority under the
BM . These positive results disappear once we look for a stronger welfare consequence
on the minority or focus on BM equilibrium outcomes.
Keywords: Matching theory, school choice, boston mechanism, affirmative action,
minority, welfare.
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O¨zet
Biz bu c¸alıs¸mada pozitif ayrımcılık politikalarının Boston mekanizması altında azınlık
o¨g˘renci grubu ac¸ısından nasıl c¸alıstıklarını inceledik. C¸og˘unluk o¨g˘renci grubuna kota
koyan pozitif ayrımcılık politikası Boston mekanizması altinda her zaman olumlu sonuc¸
vermezken, o¨ncelik bazlı ve azınlık o¨g˘rencilere yer ayıran politikalar Boston mekaniz-
masında olumlu sonuc¸lar vermektedirler. Bununla birlikte daha gu¨c¸lu¨ refah sonuc¸ları
istendig˘inde ve kis¸ilerin stratejik davrandıkları durumlarda bu u¨c¸ politika da Boston
mekanizması altında azınlık o¨g˘rencilerin faydasina c¸alıs¸mayabilmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Es¸les¸tirme teorisi, okul sec¸imi, boston mekanizması, pozitif
ayrımcılık, azınlık, refah.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Origins of matching theory take their roots from Gale and Shapley (1962)’s attempts
to match ’n’ number of women and ’n’ number of men in 1962. Since human beings
are not commodities, they do not have money value. For this reason, money and
price mechanism is not able to solve this matching problem. Thus, stable matchings
between partners can only be possible with a special mechanism. The concept that
solve such matching problems with a special mechanism in markets in which there
is no money is matching theory. Gale and Shapley (1962) suggest deferred acceptance
algorithm(DAA) to match ’n’ number of women and ’n’ number of men. The matchings
which are produced by DAA are stable. In other words, DAA is a stable mechanism.
Before going into detail, we can start with a basic definition of stability in this context.
Briefly, if any woman and man in a couple wants to match with a person in another
couple and if this person also prefers that woman or man to his/her partner, this
marriage is not stable. If there is no such a situation, the matchings are stable. We
will give the formal definition of stability below. If a mechanism always gives stable
matchings, this is a stable mechanism. Among all stable matchings the one that is
produced by deferred acceptance mechanism is the most desirable. DAA is an efficient
mechanism among all stable mechanisms.
Matching theory which is generated in Gale and Shapley (1962) ’s mathematical
article is used to solve the malfunctioning problems and to develop better matchings.
Today, different version of Gale and Shapley ’s deferred acceptance algorithm, is used to
1
match residents with hospitals and to assign seats to students in public schools in New
York City and Boston. Shapley and Scarf (1974) suggest a basic exchange economy
in their paper, namely On Cores and Indivisibility, in 1974. In this model agents can
trade their indivisible goods with better ones in the market. Every agent is restricted
to consume one indivisible good. Thus, each agent can trade their good only once.
They suggest a basic version of Top Trading Cycle(TTC) mechanism to obtain core
allocation among agents. Core allocation is an allocation at which all the coalitions
among agents do not want to deviate. We will explain how TTC and DAA works.
As we mentioned above matching theory is used in real life in many areas to solve
such efficiency problems. TTC is used to match with donors and patients who are
waiting for kidney. Because of this successful application of matching theory some
people survive. One of the most important areas among them is school choice. In
United States, students are assigned public schools in many states with mechanisms
that are produced after the attempts of Gale and Shapley. Because of the paper that
has been written by Tayfun So¨nmez and Atila Abdu¨lkadirog˘lu, namely School choice:
A mechanism design, matching theory is started to use in school choice. Thus, more
efficient assignments are produced.
The system that involves preferences which are made by parents to give seats to
students in public schools is school choice. It is not possible that every student is
assigned with her top choice. Because of that reason schools and students need some
mechanisms to obtain most desirable assignments for the sake of welfare of society.
In Turkey students are admitted by central authority. Balinski and So¨nmez (1999)
explained the shortcomings of this admission system in their paper. They proposed the
use of DAA in Turkey for the sake of efficiency.
We mentioned above stability in the marriage context. At same time stability is the
central notion in the school choice literature. We can define stability in school choice
context as follows : there should be no unmatched student-school pair (i,s) where
student i prefers school s to her assignment and she has higher priority than some other
student who is assigned a seat at school s.1
1See So¨nmez and Abdulkadirog˘lu (2003)
2
Moreover, it is well known that there exists a stable matching which is preferred to
any stable matching by every student in the context of school choice.2 Deferred accep-
tance algorithm gives students most efficient assignment among all stable matchings.
DAA works as follows: First every student ranks his/her school preferences. Every
School ranks also students according to her priorities. At step one: Each student s ap-
plies to her first choice school. Schools keep these applicants and rank them according
to their priority order. Schools give tentative acceptance to certain students who have
the highest priority up to their total quota and give rejection to the others. At step two:
Students who were rejected at first step apply their second choice school. Schools keeps
all these applicants (applicants at step one and two) and rank them according to their
priority order. Then schools give tentative acceptance to students who have the highest
priority up to their total quotas and give rejection to the others. At step k: Students
who were rejected at (k − 1)th step apply their best choice school at which they were
not rejected. Schools keeps all these applicants (applicants at step one, two, ..., and k)
and rank them according to their priority order. Schools give tentative acceptance to
students who have the highest priority up to their total quotas and give rejection to
the others. This procedure terminates at a step at which no rejection occurs. Tentative
assignments at that step will be permanent assignments.
Pareto efficiency is crucial notion in school choice. A matching is pareto efficient,
if there is no other matching that dominates it. In this context domination is pareto
domination. If every student is weakly better off and some students are strictly better off
when they have another matchings, the matchings which students have pareto dominate
to the former matchings.
Another important notion in school choice context is strategy proofness. The school
choice concept in matching theory can be allowed to transform to a preference revelation
game. If there is no incentive for students to misreport their true preferences, the
equilibrium outcomes of this game are strategy proof. If a mechanism gives always
strategy proof matchings to students, this mechanism is strategy proof. DAA is a
strategy proof mechanism.
2See Gale and Shapley (1962)
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Although DAA is stable and strategy proof mechanism, it is not perfect in school
choice context. It gives matchings that dominate matchings which belong to any stable
mechanism, but its outcome can be dominated by another matching. That is why,
stability is incompatible with pareto efficiency.
As we mentioned above, TTC is one of the most important mechanisms in matching
theory. TTC works as follows:
At step one: Every student chooses his/her best option and points to it. Then, the
school which was pointed to the student points to her best option, and this procedure
terminates once a cycle has occurred. Since there is a finite number of students and a
finite number of schools, there will be at least one cycle. After the cycles have occurred,
students are permanently assigned to the schools which they pointed to. Students who
are in the cycles are removed. Schools are removed when their capacities are exhausted.
At step two: The remaining students point to their favorite schools among the
remaining schools. The remaining schools point to students who have the highest
priority among remaining students. The new cycles have occurred. Then students are
assigned to the schools which were pointed. This procedure continues in such a fashion.
It terminates when the capacity of all schools is exhausted or every student is assigned.
TTC has very nice properties. It is more efficient than DAA. At same time students
do not have an incentive to manipulate their preferences when TTC is applied. Thus,
TTC is strategy proof. However, TTC is not a stable mechanism.
Some students can be excluded from society because of particular reasons. They
cannot be represented in public schools as much as they are in the population. Because
of this affirmative action policies are needed in the school choice context for the sake
of the representation of minorities.
Affirmative action means positive steps are taken to increase the representation of
women and minorities in areas of employment, education, and culture from which they
have been historically excluded. 3
Affirmative action policies have been broadly implemented in school choice programs
3This passage is from web site of Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. It can be found at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/affirmative-action/
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in the United States. In many school districts of America (such as in Boston prior to
1999, as well as in Columbus and Minneapolis) controlled choice constraints have been
implemented by imposing affirmative action policies.4
While the ultimate goal of these policies is to have more minority students at de-
sired schools, thereby increasing both the welfare of minorities and diversity, they have
received various criticisms. Furthermore, theoretical literature has reached negative
conclusions regarding their effectiveness. Specifically, recent studies formally demon-
strate that under certain well-known student placement mechanisms, affirmative action
policies may hurt minority students, who are the purported beneficiaries. This study
contributes to prior literature by comparing the welfare effects of certain popular af-
firmative action policies on minorities under the well-known and widely used Boston
mechanism (BM). The BM is used in various school districts such as Minneapolis,
Lee Country of Florida, and Seattle.
The Boston mechanism works as follows: Each student submits her/his preferences.
Each school ranks students according to its priorities. At step one, each student applies
to his/her top choice. Schools collect these applicants and give permanent acceptance to
students who have the highest priority according to their quotas. At step two, schools
which have exhausted their quotas and students who were accepted by a school are
removed from preference lists and priority rankings. Then students who were rejected
at the previous step apply to their top choice among remaining schools. Remaining
schools collect these applicants and give permanent assignments to students who are
the best students for them among remaining students. This procedure continues in such
a fashion. When every student is assigned to a school or every school has exhausted
its quota, the procedure terminates. BM has both shortcomings and nice properties.
BM is not a stable mechanism. However, BM is more efficient than DAA.
We implement affirmative action policies on BM . We consider three types of affir-
mative action policies: quota-type, priority-type, and reserve-type. Under the quota-
type, schools have majority-type specific quotas in addition to their usual total quotas.
Schools can not give seats to majority students when majority quotas are exhausted.
4See So¨nmez and Abdulkadirog˘lu (2003)
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Under the reserve-type, schools reserve some seats for the minority. At least one school
has a certain number of seats for minority students, and if any minority student does
not prefer these seats, majority students can be assigned to them. The final affirmative
action policy is priority-type. Under this policy, at least one school give more priority
to minority students than majority students.
In this study we offer three important definitions which are about the consequences
of policies for minorities. The first one among these definitions is pareto inferiority.
When affirmative action policy is implemented under the Boston mechanism, it gives
assignments for minorities. If every student is weakly worse off and some students are
strictly worse off when they have another matchings, the matchings which students have
pareto inferior to the former matchings. The second definition is pareto superiority.
If every student is weakly better off and some students are strictly better off when
they have another matchings, the matchings which students have pareto superior to
the former matchings. The final definition is responsiveness. An affirmative action
policy is responsive, if stronger affirmative action policy does not give pareto inferior
assignments to minority students.
We find that the BM is not responsive to the affirmative action with majority
quotas in that a stronger affirmative action with majority quotas policy may produce
a pareto inferior outcome for the minority. However, the BM is responsive to other
two policies. That is, a stronger affirmative action with minority reserves or priority-
based affirmative action policy makes some minorities better off (if they ever change the
outcome). These results are in contrast with other well-known mechanisms. Kojima
(2012) shows that all the Top Trading Cycles and stable mechanisms are non-responsive
to affirmative action with majority quotas and priority-based affirmative action. Dog˘an
(2015) finds that no stable mechanism is responsive to affirmative action with minority
reserves.
Two issues are to be visited. The positive results above do not hold once we look for
a stronger responsiveness by requiring a Pareto superior outcome for the minority after
a stronger priority-based affirmative action or stronger affirmative action with minority
reserves. Besides, we assume that students are sincere. However, it is well-known that
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the BM is open to preference manipulations. BM determines assignments according
to preferences. Since a student submits a school in her top choice, she can be assigned
to this school instead of a student who has more priority than her and who did not
submit that school in her preferences as top choice. The Boston mechanism is open to
manipulation of preferences. Because of this BM is not strategy proof.
Once students become strategic in their preference submissions, BM equilibrium
outcomes may not be responsive to any of the above affirmative actions. The Equi-
librium notion that has been just mentioned above is the Nash equilibrium. Nash
equilibrium is a situation in which no player wants to deviate from their current sit-
uation. In the school choice concept, no student wants to submit another preference
profile.
This study is broadly related to the affirmative action in school choice literature.
While there are several related papers, we mention the ones that are closely related.
Apart from the already cited ones, Hafalir and et al. (2014) consider affirmative ac-
tion policies as soft constraints, and the former introduces the affirmative action with
minority reserves.
We proceed as follows. First we introduce related studies in the related literature
chapter. Second, we describe the school choice problem as a mathematical model.
Under this chapter we define three main policies with weak and strong versions of each.
Then we explain how the Boston Mechanism works under these policies. Finally, we
obtain results. We complete our study by obtaining equilibrium results and giving
concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
Related Literature
The paper with which matching theory started is Gale and Shapley (1962). In this
paper, the authors try to answer following questions: How will schools fill their quotas?
How will students assign schools which they want? Gale and Shapley (1962) suggests a
mechanism to fill the quotas of school in an efficient way. This suggestion makes schools
and students satisfied. From this beginning, the literature on matching theory grew.
Stability and optimality notions are also suggested first in this paper. The main question
of the paper is: Is it possible to find a stable assignment for each admission problem?
In order to solve this problem, Gale and Shapley suggest a prototype of this problem,
namely marriage problem. A question, ’For any pattern of preferences is it possible to
find a stable set of marriages?’, creates deferred acceptance algorithm (DAA). For each
college admission problem, DAA provides stable and optimal assignments among all
stable assignments.
After Gale and Shapley (1962), matching theory starts to be implemented in many
important areas in real life. One of the most important areas of the implementation
of matching theory is school choice. Gale and Shapley (1962) try to solve the college
admission problem. A mechanism which solves this problem is provided in their paper.
The mechanism was DAA. The central issue of school choice is to create a mechanism
which provides assignments to students. It is impossible that every student is assigned
to her/his top choice.
The school choice and college admission problem actually is the same problem if
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we consider the priorities over students in school choice as schools’ preferences. Since
college admission and school choice are the same problem, DAA can be adopted to
school choice.1 Because of the shortcomings of school choice systems in many districts,
So¨nmez and Abdulkadirog˘lu (2003) suggested two competing mechanisms, namelyDAA
and TTC.2 So¨nmez and Abdulkadirog˘lu (2003) is the first paper to approach the school
choice problem from a mechanism design perspective. So¨nmez and Abdulkadirog˘lu
established that these two mechanisms are strategy-proof. They also established that
the top trading cycle mechanism is pareto efficient and not stable.
One important contribution of this paper which is most related part to our study
is controlled choice. For the sake of desegregation in certain districts, controlled choice
constraints are implemented.3 They showed TTC and DAA with controlled choice are
strategy proof. They also showed that DAA with controlled choice is stable and TTC
with controlled choice is pareto efficient. Controlled choice constraints and affirmative
action policies work for the same reason. To destroy racial and ethnic discrimina-
tion they are implemented with different variations. Since the first mechanism design
approach to school choice is done in this study, we can conclude that the study of affir-
mative actions in school choice started with this paper. The contribution of this paper
to matching theory is crucial. This paper is a pioneer of school choice and school choice
with affirmative action policies.
Controlled constraints are first implemented with type-specific quotas. By this
policy, the cohort is divided into subgroups and schools have the quotas for each group of
students. For the benefit of minority students, type specific quotas do a restriction to the
majority. Kojima (2012) studies affirmative action policies in the context of the school
choice problem as analyzed by So¨nmez and Abdulkadirog˘lu (2003). Kojima (2012)
looks type-specific quota and priority-based affirmative action for stable mechanisms
and TTC. He looks simple environment of controlled choice with two groups: majority
1See So¨nmez and Abdulkadirog˘lu (2003)
2In Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis and Seattle, some school choice protocols are used to rank
students. According to these protocols, there are some shortcomings. For example, students and their
parents are forced play a hard game to submit their school preferences in a very important issue.
3In Boston, first controlled choice is used in 1999. In Columbus and Minneapolis, controlled choice
is used.
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and minority. He suggests that if his claims hold in a simple environment, his claims
also hold in a more general model. We inspire from Kojima (2012) ’s study and look
the welfare effects of affirmative actions on minority students under Boston Mechanism.
In Kojima (2012) ’s paper, two important definitions are provided: respect the spirit
of affirmative action and respect the spirit of priority based affirmative action. We use
similar versions of two definitions and suggest strong versions of them. According to
Kojima (2012) ’s definitions, when an affirmative action policy is implemented; if at
least one minority student is better off, this policy respects the spirit of affirmative
action policy or the spirit of priority-based affirmative action policy. Kojima (2012)
finds that there exists no stable mechanism that respects the spirit of affirmative action
and priority-based affirmative action. He also looks whether these two definitions hold
or not for well-known matching mechanism TTC. According to his results, TTC does
not respect the spirit of affirmative action and priority-based affirmative action. He
concludes his study with the fact that the caution should be taken into account when
affirmative action policy is implemented.
The other important study about affirmative actions is Hafalir et al. (2013). The
results of Kojima (2012) show that quota and priority based affirmative action policies
hurt minority students. Hafalir et al. (2013) suggests new affirmative action policy,
namely reserves type affirmative action policy. We also investigate the effects of this
policy on minority students under the BM . Briefly, this policy reserves some seats at
schools to minority students, while no minority student claims to apply one of these
seats at one school and if these seats are not exhausted by other minority students, the
majority students can apply and can be admitted to these seats.
According to the results of this paper, reserve type affirmative action policy provides
better results than quota based affirmative action under the DAA.4 According to the
Theorem 2 of this paper, at least one minority student weakly prefers reserve type
affirmative action policy to majority quotas. However, there may be some situations at
which some minority students are worse off and the others are indifferent.5 They argue
4See Theorem 1 of Hafalir et al. (2013)
5Example 2 of this paper shows such a situation
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that there should be some assumptions to obtain better results for minority students.6
Two well-known matching algorithms are investigated with this study. The other one is
TTC. According to the results about TTC, there exists at least one minority student
who weakly prefers TTC with reserves type to TTC with no affirmative action. Finally,
they argue that there is no pareto dominance relationship between the TTC with
reserves and TTC with or without majority quotas.
Type-specific quota or quota based affirmative action policy can be interpreted as
upper bounds in controlled school choice problem. Hafalir and et al. (2014) study hard
bounds and soft bounds in controlled school choice context with the perspective of the
fairness and non-wastefulness notions. The main difference between this study and
Kojima (2012) ’s one is the diversity of type space. In Kojima (2012) ’s study there
was only two type, namely majority and minority, but in this study Hafalir and et al.
(2014) use many types.
In this study, hard bounds are defined as a number of seats for each type of student.
For each type of student, there is a floor level of seats and ceilings level of seats at each
school that is determined by the school district or law. If there is no violation to these
bounds at every school, school assignments to students are feasible. Under hard bounds
or strict bounds, they define fairness and non-wastefulness notion. According to their
results under hard bounds, the set of feasible assignments that are fair across types
may be empty in a controlled school choice. In addition, the set of feasible assignments
that are both fair for same types and non-wasteful may be empty in a controlled school
choice problem.7 They provide new form of non-wastefulness, namely constrained non-
wastefulness. After providing a new definition, they suggest a new algorithm, namely
Student Exchange Algorithm. This algorithm takes feasible and fair for same types
assignments as input and gives fair for same types and constrained non-wastefulness
6Two assumptions are suggested by them. Since every school has same priority order over students
and each student has same preferences over schools, the matchings under deferred acceptance algorithm
with minority reserves are the same with deferred acceptance algorithm with majority quotas and they
are weakly preferred by minority students to the matchings of deferred acceptance algorithm with no
affirmative action. The second assumption is set the minority reserves smartly for every school. If
minority reserves are smartly set at every school, then DAA with minority reserves pareto dominates
to DAA with no affirmative action for minorities.
7See Theorem 1 in Hafalir and et al. (2014)
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assignments as output.
Two issues are visited in this study. First, they relax fairness notion.8 After relaxing
this notion, they obtained results as we mentioned above. Secondly, they suggest to
modifying the bounds. Soft bounds are provided by them. By soft bounds, school
districts adopt a dynamic priority structure giving highest priority to student types
who have not filled their floors; medium priority to student types who have filled their
floors, but not filled their ceilings; and lowest priority to student types who have filled
their ceilings.9 When the bounds are modified in such a fashion, there will be no
feasibility constraint such as mentioned in the previous part of the paper. According
to results under student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, they guarantee the
existence of an assignment that is non-wasteful under soft bounds and fair under soft
bounds. They obtain same results for school-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm.
Finally, they compare hard bounds versus soft bounds. According to the pareto
comparison between hard bounds and soft bounds, they argue that all students are
weakly better off under soft bounds than under hard bounds in some situations.
Another important study which encouraged us to work on affirmative action poli-
cies in school choice problem is Dog˘an (2015). The crucial contribution of this study
is to design a mechanism which works with affirmative action policy for the sake of
the benefits of the minority. First, he indicates the impossibilities to do weakly bet-
ter off minority students under well known affirmative actions, namely quota based
affirmative action and reserve type affirmative actions. Clearly, if minority students
mostly have priority over majority students, then affirmative action policy works with
the intention of benefits of the minority. However, in this situation, there is no need to
implement affirmative action policy. Secondly he modifies DAA with minority reserves
to obtain better results for minority after a stronger affirmative action. Dog˘an (2015)
is inspired by the working process of DAA with minority reserves. In the working
process of the DAA, some minority students might initiate a rejection cycle. Clearly,
a minority student can be accepted tentatively a school and a majority student might
8The relaxed mode of fairness is defined as fairness for same types.
9See Part 4 in Hafalir and et al. (2014)
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be rejected from this school because of minority reserves. This rejection initiates a
rejection cycle. Finally, the minority student who had tentative acceptance at first step
can be rejected at step k. He defined such minority as interferer and changed them
as the majority. The main principle of Modified Deferred Acceptance Algorithm with
Minority Reserve(MDAm) is this. MDAm has a weakly fairness property and mini-
mally responsive.10 The bad news about MDAm is that the algorithm does not have
strategy-proofness property. However, there is no assignment rule which is fair with
conditional reserve, minimally responsive, and strategy-proof.11
We have mentioned the studies which are about affirmative action policies in school
choice context so far. These studies investigate the effects of affirmative action policies
on students and look with axiomatic perspective. Some studies, namely Dog˘an (2015),
suggest a new algorithm which effectively works with affirmative action with the inten-
tion of minority’s welfare and some studies, namely Hafalir et al. (2013) suggest a new
affirmative action policy. Since our study is about effects of affirmative action policies
under BM , it is necessary to look studies which are about the affirmative action policies
and the BM .
In the final part of related literature part, we investigate studies which are about
the BM . First, we should mention Kojima and Unver (2014). This study is the first
study which provides the characterizations of the BM with an axiomatic perspective.
They use the standard modeling of the two-sided matching market in school choice
context but they provide a difference: a priority structure in a school choice problem
induces a new BM . They also provide as a remark that there is no two distinct priority
structure that gives the same BM . They emphasize the welfare property of the BM
and define the axiom of the respect of preference ranking. Briefly, this notion says
that a student who gives higher preference to a school than other students will be
admitted to this school if the quota is not exhausted. At the first glance, this notion
can be understood as a characteristic of the working process of the BM . However, they
10MDAm is fair with conditional reserve. At least one minority is better off under this algorithm
with a stronger affirmative action policy. For definition of fairness with conditional reserve can be seen
in Dog˘an (2015).
11See Theorem 5 of Dog˘an (2015)
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provide a BM which is induced by a priority structure cannot satisfy this axiom.12
BM is criticized because of the lack of strategy-proofness. A student can be ad-
mitted to a better school by misreporting his preferences under the BM . This axiom
is incompatible with the axiom of the respect of preference rankings. They provide a
new axiom, namely rank-respecting invariance (r.r. invariance). Before providing the
definition of r.r. invariance, we should provide the definition of the axiom of monotonic
transformation. It is said that P ′ is a monotonic transformation of P at c ∈ C ∪ {∅}
if every school that is ranked above c under P ′ is ranked above c under P . Addition-
ally, if the set of students, who are in competition with i for his assigned school, does
not expand when i has a monotonic transformation preferences profile, this monotonic
transformation is a rank-respecting monotonic transformation for student i. A mech-
anism ”ϕ” satisfies rank-respecting invariance if, for any pair of preference profiles P
and P ′, a rank-respecting monotonic transformation does not change the assignments.
This axiom can be accepted as a different version of strategy-proofness. According
to his results, a mechanism ”ϕ” is BM induced by a priority structure if and only
if respects preference ranking and satisfies resource monotonicity, consistency and r.r.
invariance.13
In the final part of their study, they provide a special environment. According to
this environment, every school has one student seat. Their second crucial result is that
a mechanism ”ϕ” is the BM induced by a priority structure if and only if ”ϕ” respects
preference rankings and satisfies individual rationality14, population monotonicity and
r.r. invariance under this special environment. 15
In contrast of the article of Kojima and Unver (2014), Afacan (2013) suggests a
new axiom which holds for every problem in school choice context, namely respect both
preference rankings and priorities. According to the definition, if a student prefers a
12See Example 2 of Kojima and Unver (2014)
13If a school increases her quota, every student is weakly better off under a resource monotonic
mechanism. If a student is removed from the school choice problem, another students’ assignments do
not change under consistent mechanisms.
14Individual rationality says that if a student prefers a school to her assignment then this school
exhausted their quota. If we remove a student from a school choice problem, this school choice problem
provides weakly better results to other students under a mechanism which is population monotone.
15See Theorem 2 of Kojima and Unver (2014)
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school to her assignment, either she is unacceptable at this school or she does not rank
this school as high as students who are assigned to this school. If she ranks this school
equally with the students who are assigned to this school, her priority is lower than
the students who are assigned to this school. Additionally, Afacan (2013) provides a
new definition individually rationality for schools. An unacceptable student can not be
assigned to any school under an individually rational for schools matchings. According
to his results, a mechanism is BM if and only if it is individually rational for schools
and respects both preference and priorities at every priority structure. The crucial
difference between Afacan (2013) ’s study and Kojima and Unver (2014) ’s study is the
taking priority structure as primitive to the model. Afacan (2013) characterizes BM
as individual rational for schools and respects both preference and priorities for every
priority structure.
We terminate our literature review with Afacan (2013) ’s study. After the literature
review, we provide the primitives of school choice problem with affirmative actions.
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Chapter 3
The Model
A school choice problem with affirmative actions is a tuple (S,C,i∈S∪C , q, r) where
• S and C are finite and disjoint sets of students and schools.
• S = SM ∪ Sm where SM and Sm are the set of majority and minority students,
respectively.
• = (s)s∈S is the preference profile of the students over C and being unassigned,
denoted by ∅. We write c s c′ if and only if c s c′ but not c = c′. A school
acceptable to student s if c s ∅.
• = (c)c∈C is the priority profile of the schools over S
• q = (qc, qMc ) is the capacity profile of the schools such that qc is the total quota
of the school c, and qMc is the majority type-specific quota.
• r = (rc)c∈C is the minority reserves profile of the schools.
A matching µ is a mapping from C ∪ S to C ∪ S ∪ ∅ such that
1. µ(s) ∈ C ∪ ∅
2. For any s ∈ S and c ∈ C, µ(s) = c if and only if s ∈ µ(c).
3. µ(c) ⊆ S and |µ(c)| ≤ qc for all c ∈ C.
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4. |µ(c) ∩ SM | ≤ qMc for all c ∈ C.
A matching µ is pareto inferior to µ′, if for every student s ∈ S µ′(s) s µ(s)
holds , and at least for one s ∈ S strictly holds. A matching µ is pareto superior to
µ′, if for every student s ∈ S µ(s) s µ′(s) holds, and for at least one s ∈ S strictly
holds.
The first affirmative action policy is affirmative action with majority quotas
or simply majority quotas. At the school c which implements majority quotas, can
not be accepted the number of majority students which is greater than its majority
quotas. The maximum number of majority students admitted by c is equal to qMc .
The second affirmative action policy is affirmative action with minority re-
serves or simply minority reserves. It is implemented by reserving some seats for
minority students. Minority students are ranked above all majority students until the
reserved seats are exhausted at the school in which minority reserves is implemented.
A majority student can be admitted by the school, when minority reserves are not ex-
hausted and no minority student prefers that school to her assigned shcool. However,
at a school majority quotas is implemented, a majority student can not be admitted
when majority quotas was exhausted.
The final affirmative action policy is priority-based affirmative action. At a
school that priority-based affirmative action policy is implemented, the ranking of at
least one minority student is promoted relative to majority students, but the relative
ranking of each student does not change within her own group.
Consider the following Boston Mechanism(BM) adapted to affirmative actions:
Step 1. Each student applies to his best acceptable school. Each offer receiving
school c first considers minority applicants and permanently accepts them up to its
minority reserve rc one at a time following its priority order. School c then considers
all the applicants who are yet to be accepted, and one at a time following its priority
order, it permanently accepts as many students as up to the remaining total capacity
while not admitting more majority students than qMc .
In general,
Step k. Each rejected student in the previous round applies to his next best accept-
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able school. Each offer receiving school c which still has an available seat first considers
minority applicants and permanently accepts them up to its left minority reserve one
at a time following its priority order. School c then considers all the applicants who
are yet to be accepted, and one at a time following its priority order, it permanently
accepts as many students as up to the remaining total capacity while not admitting
more majority students than the remaining majority quotas.
The algorithm terminates whenever each student is either accepted by a school or
has all acceptable offers rejected. The assignments at the terminal round realize as the
final BM outcome.
A matching mechanism φ is a systematic procedure which provides assignments to
the students for each school choice problem with affirmative actions.
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Chapter 4
Consequences of the Affirmative
Action Policies Under the Boston
Mechanism
In this chapter, we investigate the welfare effects of three affirmative action policies
under the BM.
Definition 1 Given a school choice problem as a market G = (S,C,c∈C ,s∈S, q, r)
is said to have a stronger affirmative action with majority quotas than G˜ =
(S,C,c∈C ,s∈S, q¯, r) if for every school c ∈ C qMc = q¯Mc and qMc ≥ q¯Mc .
This definition basically says that stronger affirmative action with majority quotas
requires lower majority quotas.
Definition 2 A mechanism φ is responsive to the stronger affirmative action
with majority quotas if there is no market pair G and G˜ such that G˜ has a stronger
affirmative action with majority quotas policy than G, and G˜ is Pareto inferior to G
for the minority.
According to this definition, if the results of the stronger affirmative action policy are
strictly better off at least for one minority student, it, then, can be concluded that this
stronger affirmative action policy is responsive for minority. The spirit of this definition
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could be summarized as follows: Responsive affirmative action with majority quotas
could be strictly worse off for all minority students expect for one. Clearly, a stronger
affirmative action with majority quotas might be beneficial for one minority student
and might be hurt for the remaining of minority students.
Example 1 Let C = {c1, c2, c3}, S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}. SM = {s1, s2}, Sm = {s3, s4}.
In the following part of the example, students’ preferences and schools’ priorities
are provided. Students are listed according to the priority ordering of the schools. For
instance, for every school, s1 represents the student who has highest priority, s2 is
the second best student in the priority ordering, and s3 has the lowest priority in the
ordering of all schools.
In students’ preferences, schools are listed according to the preferences of the stu-
dents. For instance, c1 is the first choice for s1 and the assignment of c1 gives the
highest utility to the first student, the order of the other schools is arbitrary.
c1,c2,c3 : s1, s2, s3, s4.
s1 : c1, ...,
s2 : c1, c3, ...,
s3 : c1, c2, ...,
s4 : c1, c3, c2, ....
In the end of the preferences of students the notation of ... shows that the remaining
part of the preferences are arbitrary.
The quotas vectors are as follows. ”q” represents initial quotas and ”q¯” represents
other quotas vector that corresponds stronger affirmative action with majority quotas
vector. First element of this vectors is total quotas of the school c, qc, and second
element represents majority quotas, qMc , at school c. Simply, q
M
c > q¯
M
c .
qc1 = (2, 2)
qc2 = (1, 1)
qc3 = (1, 1)
q¯c1 = (2, 1)
qc2 = (1, 1)
qc3 = (1, 1)
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BM works as follows: At first step, all students apply to c1. According to q of
c1, and the priority structure, c1 provides permanent acceptance to the s1 and s2. At
second step, s3 applies to c2 and s4 applies to c3. Final assignments take place as follows
according to the q:
BM =
 c1 c2 c3
s1, s2 s3 s4
 .
After changing the majority quotas vector, at school c1, from q
M
c1
= 2 to q¯Mc1 = 1,
final outcome of stronger affirmative action with majority quotas under the BM, (BM ′),
occurs as follows:
BM ′ =
 c1 c2 c3
s1, s3 s4 s2
 .
Example 1 shows that stronger affirmative action with majority quotas is useful for
one minority student (s1), while the other minority student(s4) is being hurt. Our main
aim is to provide an answer to whether responsiveness of stronger affirmative action
with majority quotas holds for every school choice problem or not. Unfortunately, in
contrast of the Example 1 the negative results might appear.
Theorem 1 The BM is not responsive to the stronger affirmative action with majority
quotas.
Proof. Consider the following market G = (S,C,s∈S,c∈C ,q) and G˜ = (S,C,s∈S
,c∈C , q¯). G˜ has a stronger affirmative action with majority quotas than G. Let
C = {c1, c2, c3}, S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, and SM = {s1, s2}, Sm = {s3, s4}, and
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qc1 = (qc1 , q
M
c1
) = (2, 2)
qc2 = (1, 1)
qc3 = (1, 1)
q¯c1 = (2, 1)
qc2 = (1, 1)
qc3 = (1, 1)
Students’ preferences are given by
s1 : c1, ...,
s2 : c1, c2, c3,
s3 : c3, c2, c1,
s4 : c3, c2, c1.
Schools’ priorities are given by
c1 : s1, s2, s3, s4,
c2 : s2, s3, s4, s1,
c3 : s4, s2, s3, s1,
According to the initial quotas, (q), the outcome of the BM occurs as the following
way:
BM =
 c1 c2 c3
s1, s2 s3 s4
 .
After having a stronger affirmative action with majority quotas, based on new quo-
tas, (q¯), the outcome of BM occurs as follows:
BM ′ =
 c1 c2 c3
s1, s3 s2 s4
 .
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Student s3 is worse off under the BM
′ than BM when a stronger affirmative action
with majority quotas is implemented. The assignment of s4 do not change. It is
concluded that BM ′ is pareto inferior to BM for the minority. This counter example
completes the proof.
In the example that presented in the proof, two minority students are weakly worse
off. This situation is observed because of the implementation of stronger affirmative
action policy. It is resulted that majority students also can be weakly worse off with a
stronger affirmative action policy. s1 has the same assignment, but s2 is assigned by a
worse school than his initial assignment.
In the Example 1, we give an example in which at least one minority student is
better off followed by a stronger affirmative action policy. However, this is not the case
is realized for every school choice problem.
We have seen that stronger affirmative action with majority quotas is not helpful
for the minority for every school choice problem. The second policy that we investigate
welfare effects on minority student is minority reserves.
Definition 3 Given a school choice problem as a market G = (S,C,c∈C ,s∈S, q, r)
is said to have stronger affirmative action with minority reserves than G˜ =
(S,C,c∈C ,s∈S, q, r˜) if, for every school c ∈ C r˜c ≥ rc.
This definition basically states that a stronger affirmative action with minority re-
serves requires increasing minority reserves at certain schools and keeping the same at
the other schools.
Definition 4 A mechanism φ is responsive to the stronger affirmative action
with minority reserves if there is no market pair G and G˜ such that G˜ has a stronger
affirmative action with minority reserves policy than G, and G˜ is Pareto inferior to G
for the minority.
We look at the responsiveness of majority quotas policy and obtain a negative result
for minority. The intuition behind the negative result is the rejection cycle that occurs
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after stronger restriction for majority students at schools. In the example presented in
the proof, increasing majority quotas at school c1 has caused to the rejection of majority
student s2. At the second step of BM , s2 has applied to the same school with s3 and this
has caused a rejection of a minority student at the second step. Finally, this rejection
cycle has caused a worse assignment for minority student s3 while the assignment of
other minority student is not changed. Clearly, a weakly worse assignment for every
minority student has occurred due to the increasing of strict restriction of majority
students at school c1.
Minority reserves policy does not have a strict restriction on reserved seats for
minority. If there is not satisfactory demand for the reserved seats from minority
students, then these seats can be open for majority students. This is the main difference
between these two affirmative action policies. Because of this, the positive results
appear for minority students after having a stronger affirmative action with minority
reserves.
Theorem 2 The BM is responsive to the stronger affirmative action with minority
reserves.
Proof. There will be two cases:
(i) There is no change in the assignments. At this case, having a stronger affirmative
action with minority reserves does not give pareto inferior assignments to the
minority students and it trivially satisfies the responsiveness.
(ii) There is at least one change in the assignments of students. Consider the first
change will occur at step k at school c. (S,C,c∈C ,s∈S,qc∈C) are the same
when a stronger affirmative action with minority reserves policy is implemented.
The only primitive that is changed is r. r represents the initial minority reserves
and r˜ represents a stronger affirmative action with minority reserves parameter.
Suppose that A(c, r) represents the set of applicants of c with the r reserves for
minority. A(c, r˜) is the set of applicants of school c with the r˜ reserves for minority.
Since the preferences of students do not change, A(c, r) = A(c, r˜) for every s ∈ S. Let
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r?c and q
?
c represent the remaining minority reserves seats and the remaining total seats
at kth step at school c, respectively. Since the first change of assignments occurs at the
kth step after passing stronger affirmative action with minority reserves, the remaining
quotas of schools before kth step are the same.
Claim 1. r˜ > r at kth step.
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose not.
(1) Let r˜ = r. At school c, priority ordering over students and total quotas do
not change when a stronger affirmative action with minority reserves policy is
implemented. If minority reserves are equal to the each other, r˜ = r. There will
be no change in assignments of students. However, we assume that there is a
change at school c at kth step. There is a contradiction.
(2) Let r˜ < r. According to the definition of stronger affirmative action with minority
reserves, r˜ < r creates a contradiction. This completes the proof of Claim1.
Claim 2. ∃s ∈ A(c, r) = A(c, r˜) such that s ∈ Sm.
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose any s ∈ A(c, r), s ∈ SM .As the only thing that changes
at school c is minority reserves, there is no change in assignments at that school. On the
other hand, we suppose that there is a change at school c at the kth step. This creates
a contradiction. Therefore, there is at least one minority student s, say, s ∈ A(c, r).
This completes the proof of Claim 2.
Let Aˆ(c, r) be the set of students who are admitted by the school c. We create a
set, titled N , as follows: N = {s ∈ A(c, r) = A(c, r˜)|s /∈ Aˆ(c, r) and s ∈ Aˆ(c, r˜)}
Claim 3. ∃s ∈ N such that s ∈ Sm
Proof of Claim 3. Suppose for any s ∈ N , s ∈ SM . s ∈ A(c, r) = A(c, r˜) and
s /∈ Aˆ(c, r). We create a set as follows: G = {s ∈ S|s ∈ A(c, r) and s c s′ for
any s′ ∈ N}. Let q?′c represents the total remaining quotas for school c after changing
reserves from r to r˜. We know that q?c = q
?′
c at k
th step for school c and for every
s ∈ SM , |G| ≥ q?c . From s ∈ SM , s /∈ Aˆ(c, r), and |G| ≥ q?c implies s /∈ Aˆ(c, r˜).
However, s ∈ N . A contradiction is appeared here. At least one minority student must
be in N . This completes the proof.
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In the proof we have completed above, the only thing which is changed is the
number of minority reserves after having a stronger affirmative action with minority
reserves. We assume that this change occurs at school c, and at the step k at first
time. The fundamental idea behind the proof is that, as we have changed minority
reserves, minority students are affected by this change. Since the all other primitives
of the school choice problem are the same after having stronger affirmative action with
minority reserves, at least one minority student have a better assignment under the
BM .
Next, we introduce two definitions which are related to priority-based affirmative
action policy.
Definition 5 Given a school choice problem as a market G = (S,C,c∈C ,s∈S, q, r)
is said to be have a stronger priority-based affirmative action than G˜ =
(S,C, ˜c∈C ,s∈S, q, r) if, for every school c ∈ C and s, s′ where s ∈ Sm, s c s′,
then s ˜c s′.
This definition says that, the relative ranking of minority students over majority
students at every school are the same or are promoted when a stronger priority-based
affirmative action policy is implemented.
Definition 6 A mechanism φ is responsive to the stronger priority-based af-
firmative action, if there is no market pair G and G˜ such that G˜ has a stronger
priority-based affirmative action policy than G, and G˜ is Pareto inferior to G for the
minority.
Theorem 3 The BM is responsive to the stronger priority-based affirmative action.
The idea behind the proof will be presented below is very similar to the logic of the
proof of Theorem 2.
Proof.
There will be two cases:
26
(i) There is no change in the assignments. At this case having stronger priority-
based affirmative action will not give Pareto inferior assignments to the minority
students and it trivially satisfies the responsiveness.
(ii) There is at least one change in the assignments of students. Consider the first
change that will be identified at step k at school c. (S,C,s∈S,qc∈C , r) are the
same when a stronger priority-based affirmative action policy is implemented.
Suppose that A(c,) represents the set of applicants of c with the  priority order.
A(c, ˜) is the set of applicants of the school c with the ˜ priority order. Since the
preferences of students do not change, A(c,) = A(c, ˜) for every s ∈ S. Let q?c
represents the remaining total seats at the kth step at the school c. Since the first change
of assignments occurs at the kth step after passing stronger priority-based affirmative
action, the remaining quotas of schools before kth step are the same. Let q?′c represents
the remaining total seats of school c after passing stronger priority-based affirmative
action policy.
Claim 1. ∃s ∈ A(c,) = A(c, ˜) such that s ∈ Sm.
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose that s ∈ A(c,) = A(c, ˜) and s ∈ SM . Since
q?c = q
?′
c , c, and the priority ordering of majority students within their own group do
not change at school c, at step k there will be no change. However, we assume that
there will a change at first time at kth step. There is a contradiction. Therefore, at least
one minority student will apply to the school c. This completes the proof of Claim1.
We construct a set as follows: Aˆ(c,) = {s ∈ S|s ∈ A(c,) and s is placed at
school c at step k under }
We create second set as follows: N = {s ∈ A(c,) = A(c, ˜) — s /∈ Aˆ(c,) and
s ∈ Aˆ(c, ˜)}
Claim 2. ∃s ∈ N such that s ∈ Sm.
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose that for any s ∈ N , s ∈ SM . s ∈ A(c,) = A(c, ˜)
and s /∈ Aˆ(c,).
Let we construct two sets as follows: EB = {s ∈ S|s ∈ A(c,) and s c s′ for any
s′ ∈ N}, EB′ = {s ∈ S|s ∈ A(c, ˜) and s ˜c s′ for any s′ ∈ N}.
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We know that q?c = q
?′
c at k
th step for school c, |EB| ≥ q?′c and |EB′| ≥ q?′c .
From s ∈ SM , s /∈ Aˆ(c,), |EB| ≥ q?′c , and |EB′| ≥ q?′c s must be s /∈ Aˆ(c, ˜). This
contradicts with s ∈ N . Therefore, there must be at leats one minority student which
is s ∈ N .
It is beneficial to remind that, we have investigated responsiveness of BM to the
stronger affirmative action policies. Responsiveness is a weak requirement. The situa-
tions in which every minority student is made(weakly) worse off by a stronger affirmative
action policy is only excluded by it. Now, we define stronger version of responsiveness
and control whether BM is strongly responsive to the priority-based affirmative action
and affirmative action with minority reserves. We do not investigate that the strongly
responsiveness of affirmative action with majority quotas because this policy mentioned
before does not satisfy the weak version of responsiveness.
Definition 7 A mechanism φ is strongly responsive to the priority-based af-
firmative action or affirmative action with minority reserves, if for every
market pair G and G˜ such that G˜ has a stronger priority-based affirmative action policy
or stronger affirmative action with minority reserves than G, and G˜ is Pareto superior
to G for the minority.
Theorem 4 The BM is not strongly responsive to the priority-based affirmative action
policy.
Proof. Consider the following problem G = (S,C,c∈C ,s∈S,q, r) such that C =
{c1, c2, c3, c4} , S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5} , SM = {s1, s2} , Sm = {s3, s4, s5} , qc1 = (2, 2) ,
qc2 = (1, 1) , qc3 = (1, 1) and qc4 = (1, 1).
Students’ preferences and schools’ priorities are given by
s1 : c1, c3, c4, c2, s2 : c1, c3, c4, c2,
s3 : c1, c2, c3, c4, s4 : c1, c3, c4, c2,
s5 : c1, c3, c2, c4.
c1 : s1, s2, s3, s4, s5,
c2 : s2, s5, s3, s4, s1,
c3 : c1, c2, c5, c4, s3,
c4 : c4, c2, c3, c1, s5.
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Let G′ has a stronger priority-based affirmative action with ′c1 : s3, s4, s5, s1, s2. The
remaining part of the problem G is same as G′. The BM outcomes of G and G′ are as
follows:
BM =
 c1 c2 c3 c4
s1, s2 s3 s5 s4
 BM ′ =
 c1 c2 c3 c2
s3, s4 s5 s1 s2

Although G′ has a stronger priority-based affirmative action policy than G, the
outcome of G′ is not Pareto superior to G. This completes the proof.
Theorem 5 The BM is not strongly responsive to the affirmative action with minority
reserves.
Proof. Consider the following problem G = (S,C,c∈C ,s∈S,q, r) such that C =
{c1, c2, c3} , S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} , SM = {s1, s2} , Sm = {s3, s4} , qc1 = (2, 0) , qc2 = (1, 0)
and qc3 = (1, 0) where q = (qc, r).
Students’ preferences and schools’ priorities are given by
s1 : c1, c2, c3, s2 : c1, c3, c2,
s3 : c1, c3, c2, s4 : c1, c2, c3.
c1 : s1, s2, s3, s4, c2 : s2, s3, s4, s1,
c3 : c2, c3, c1, c4.
Let G′ has a stronger affirmative action with minority reserves with q′c1 = (2, 1).
The remaining part of the problem G is same as G′. The BM outcomes of G and G′
are as follows:
BM =
 c1 c2 c3
s1, s2 s4 s3
 BM ′ =
 c1 c2 c3
s1, s4 s3 s2

Although G′ has a stronger affirmative action with minority reserves than G, the
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outcome of G′ is not Pareto superior to G. This completes to the proof.
We prove that stronger requirement for responsiveness does not hold for with the
priority-based affirmative action and affirmative action with minority reserves.
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Chapter 5
Strategic Results
A school choice problem can be converted in to a preference revelation game. According
to this game, students’ preferences over schools are the strategies and the payoffs of the
students are determined by the outcomes of the BM . The equilibrium concept of this
game is Nash equilibrium. The formal definition of Nash equilibrium is as follows : 1
• Let S1 be the strategy profile of Player 1.
• Let s1 be an element of the strategy profile of Player 1.
• Let u1 be the payoff of Player 1.
Definition 8 In the n-player normal-form game G = {S1, ..., Sn;u1, ..., un}, the strate-
gies (s?1, ..., s
?
n) are a Nash equilibrium(NE) if, for each player i, s
?
i is player i’s best
response to the strategies specified for the n - 1 other players, (s?1, ..., s
?
i−1, s
?
i+1, ..., s
?
n) :
ui(s
?
1, ..., s
?
i−1, s
?
i , s
?
i+1, ..., s
?
n) ≥ ui(s?1, ..., s?i−1, si, s?i+1, ..., s?n)
for every feasible strategy s1 in S1 ; that is, s
?
i solves
maxsi∈Si ui(s
?
1, ..., s
?
i−1, si, s
?
i+1, ..., s
?
n)
To be more clear, we provide an example of reveal preference game.
Example 2 Let C = {c1, c2} and S = {s1, s2} be the sets of students and schools. The
set of strategies is { (c1c2),(c1c2) }. The game matrix is provided as follows:
1This formal definition is from Gibbons (1992)
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Student s2
c1c2 c2c1
Student s1
c1c2 (1, 0) (1, 1)
c2c1 (1, 1) (1, 0)
The Nash equilibrium of this game:
NE1 = {(c2c1); (c1c2)}
NE2 = {(c1c2); (c2c1)}
So far now, we assume that students are sincere. However, the BM is manipulable;
thereby, students may strategically misreport their preferences. Once we allow for that
and focus on the equilibrium outcomes of the BM , the positive results would no longer
hold. Moreover, the negative affirmative action with majority quotas result carries over
to the strategic setting. To see this, let S = {s1, s2, s3} , C = {c1, c2} , with qc1 = (1, 1)
, qc2 = (1, 1) where qc = (qc, q
M
c ). Let S
M = {s3}. Students’ preferences and schools’
priorities are as follows:
s1 s2 s3
Uc1 1 1 2
Uc2 0 2 1
U∅ 0 0 0
s1 : c1, ∅, s2 : c2, c1, ∅, s3 : c1, c2, ∅.
c1 = c2 : s3, s2, s1.
Let us first consider the non-affirmative action case, that is, rc1 = rc2 = 0. The
game matrixes are provided by
Student s3 plays (c1c2)
c1c2 c2c1
c1 0, 2, 2 0, 2, 2
Student s3 plays (c2c1)
c1c2 c2c1
c1 0, 1, 1 1, 0, 1
There are two NE
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NE1 = {(c1); (c1c2); (c1c2)}
NE2 = {(c1); (c2c1); (c1c2)}
The NE outcome is
BM =
 s1 s2 s3
∅ c2 c1

Now, let us consider that rc1 = 1 while keeping rc2 = 0. Then, the unique NE and
outcome is
NE = {(c1); (c1c2); (c2c1)}
BM ′ =
 s1 s2 s3
∅ c1 c2

If we keep rc1 = rc2 = 0, and instead let c1 : s2, s1, s3. The unique equilibrium
outcome is BM ′ again, which is pareto inferior to BM for the minority. For the
affirmative action with majority quotas case, let S = {s1, s2, s3} , C = {c1, c2, c3} ,
with qc1 = (1, 1) , qc2 = (1, 1) , qc3 = (1, 1) where qc = (qc, q
M
c ). Let S
M = {s2}.
Students’ preferences and schools’ priorities are as follows:
s1 : c1, ∅, s2 : c3, c2, ∅, s3 : c1, c2, c3, ∅.
c1=c2 : s1, s2, s3,
c3 : s3, s2, s1.
There are six NE and each of them provides the following outcome
BM ′ =
 s1 s2 s3
c1 c3 c2

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Now, let us consider that qMc3 = 0 while keeping q
M
c1
= qMc2 = 1. Then, the unique
equilibrium outcome is
BM ′ =
 s1 s2 s3
c1 c2 c3

The negative results for affirmative action with majority quotas case carry over to
the strategic setting.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
We investigate the welfare and strategic results of three affirmative action policies under
the BM . According to our results, affirmative action with majority quotas does not
work for the sake of minority students all the while. The other two affirmative action
policies, namely priority-based and minority reserves, provide better assignment to at
least one minority student. When we analyze the strongly responsiveness and strategic
results of the affirmative action policies, it is basically seen that three affirmative action
policies do not work for the sake of minority students under the BM .
School choice is an important field in which matching theory. Determining welfare
consequences of the affirmative action policies for minority is important in an effort
to implement successful policies. The welfare consequences of the affirmative action
policies under BM for minority are investigated first with this study. In our results,
affirmative action with majority quotas is contrary to the main goal of the policy. This
implies that the authorities should be cautious when they employ affirmative action
policies. In contrast of the DAA and TTC, BM is responsive to the minority reserves
and priority-based affirmative action policy.
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